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One of the most striking developments in the United States capital mar- 
kets during the past decade has been an enormous increase in the riskiness 
of long-term bonds and other fixed income securities. This has stemmed 
in part from increased inflation uncertainty and in part from fundamental 
shifts in Federal Reserve policies. In this paper we measure this phenom- 
enon and explore its implications for the returns required by investors on 
these debt instruments and the equity securities which can substitute for 
them in wealth portfolios. We believe that our results help to explain why 
real interest rates on long-term bonds have been so high in recent years. 
The data set used in the paper also enables us to address a different, al- 
though somewhat related,  issue in the study of United States financial 
markets: Why, despite the apparent increase in inflation risk in the recent 
past, has no private market for indexed bonds developed in the United 
States? 
The paper  is  organized as  follows. We  first  discuss alternative  ap- 
proaches to estimating risk premiums on debt and equity securities and 
then explain our approach, which is based on modern portfolio theory. 
We apply our model to data on common stocks and on United States gov- 
ernment bonds of eight different maturities to estimate risk premiums for 
the period 1973-83.  Next we estimate the risk premium on Treasury bills 
relative to a hypothetical riskless real rate of interest over that same period. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of our model for the question why no 
private market for index-linked bonds exists in the United States. 
Zvi Bodie is professor of finance and economics, Boston University School of Manage- 
ment, and is a research associate  at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Alex Kane is 
associate professor of finance, Boston University School of Management, and is a research 
fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Robert McDonald is assistant profes- 
sor of finance, Northwestern University Graduate School of Management, and is a research 
fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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3.1  Estimating Risk Premiums 
All investors, be they individual or institutional investors seeking to al- 
locate funds or a nonfinancial business entity seeking to acquire funds, 
are faced with choosing the proportions of debt and equity in their portfo- 
lio. Making this decision requires knowing both the expected rates of re- 
turn on assets and the riskiness of those assets. A basic tenet of financial 
economies is that in equilibrium, expected returns on the various traded 
assets will reflect the perceived risk inherent in them. In a capital market 
dominated by risk-averse investors, the riskier the asset the higher the pre- 
mium it will have to bear over the riskless rate of interest. This premium is 
usually called the “risk premium,” and in general it is unobservable. 
In order to make their investment and financing decisions, all parties 
involved must quantify their beliefs  regarding  the relative magnitudes 
of these  risk  premiums.  Traditionally  there  have  been  two  generic 
approaches to estimating risk premiums:  (1)  statistical estimation based 
on ex post data and (2) estimation based on economic models of secu- 
rity price formation coupled with forecasts of the fundamental variables 
in the models  (e.g.,  earnings  forecasts for stocks, the yield curve  for 
bonds).  Most  analysts  have  used  some combination  of  these two ap- 
proaches. 
Often one or even both of  these approaches results in estimated risk 
premiums  for some assets which violate one’s criterion of “reasonable- 
ness,” based on the perceived risk of those assets. For example, in many 
studies, past rates of return are used to compute means, variances, and co- 
variances. The means are then taken as measures of expected future re- 
turns and the variances and covariances as measures of risk. Unfortunately, 
at times some of the risk premiums implied by the estimated means bear a 
relationship to the estimated risk measures, which contradicts the theory 
underlying the study. 
Our approach is to  use past data solely to  obtain risk measures and then 
to  compute the corresponding risk premiums implied by theory. Our rea- 
son for ignoring the estimated means is that, in order to get a reliable esti- 
mate of the mean of a stochastic time series, it is necessary to observe it 
over a long span of time. If the mean is changing over the period of obser- 
vation, reliable estimation is virtually impossible.  Variances and covar- 
iances, however, can be measured  fairly accurately  over much shorter 
sample periods. 
We view our approach as a supplement to other, more traditional meth- 
ods of estimating risk premiums and think that it can be used to check the 
reasonableness of the estimates which they provide. 
1. See Merton (1980) for a full discussion of this point. 53  Risk and Required Returns on Debt and Equity 
3.2  The Model 
The theoretical model we employ is a modified version of the capital as- 
set pricing model, which has become the standard financial model of cap- 
ital market equilibrium over the past two decades and has gained wide- 
spread acceptance within the financial industry under the name Modern 
Portfolio Theory (MPT). The fundamental insight of  this model is that 
the riskiness of  an individual asset is not its volatility or riskiness consid- 
ered in isolation but rather its contribution to the risk of a portfolio of as- 
sets. The model has most frequently been used in the past to explain the 
structure of required returns on common stocks, but it applies just as well 
to all other traded assets, including bonds. 
This theory implies that in equilibrium, the risk premium on any traded 
asset can be expressed as the product of two terms: 
(1)  risk premium on asset i  = 
average degree of risk aversion of market participants  x 
covariance of asset i with the market portfolio. 
The first term, the average degree of risk aversion,2 is the same for all as- 
sets, and thus at any point in time is simply a constant of proportionality. 
The second term, the covariance with the market portfolio,) is thus the 
critical determinant of .differences in risk premiums across asset categor- 
ies. 
The market portfolio is by definition composed of all existing assets in 
the economy, each held in proportion to its relative outstanding supply. 
The covariance of any asset with the market portfolio is the sum of two 
factors: (1) the relative supply of that security times its own variance and 
(2) a weighted sum of its covariances with all other assets. 
To facilitate our understanding of the empirical results to follow, let us 
examine how these factors work for the case of three categories of assets: 
stocks, bonds, and bills. Let us assume that the market portfolio consists 
of 65% stocks, 10% bonds, and 25%  bills and that bills are riskless. The 
risk premiums would then be 
risk premium on stocks = risk aversion  x (.65 variance of stocks + 
.1 covariance between stocks and bonds) 
risk premium on bonds  = risk aversion  x (. 1  variance of bonds + 
.65 covariance between stocks and bonds). 
2. The measure of risk aversion referred to is Pratt’s coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
The higher the value of this coefficient, the greater the compensation an investor requires to 
bear a given degree of risk. For a complete explanation see Bodie et al. (1985). 
3. The covariance referred to here is the covariance between the real rate of return on secu- 
rity i and the real rate of return on the market portfolio. 54  Zvi Bodie/Alex Kane/Robert McDonald 
In the results presented in the next section we will refer to the correla- 
tion coefficient between asset returns rather than the covariance. The cor- 
relation coefficient is a more familiar measure of comovement in returns, 
and it is related to covariance by the following formula: 
covariance between stocks and bonds  = correlation coefficient  x  stan- 
dard deviation of stocks x stan- 
dard deviation of bonds. 
The standard deviation is the square root of variance. 
In the following section we estimate what the risk premiums implied by 
this model were over the period 1973-83 on 10 categories of financial as- 
sets: common stocks, bills, and United States government bonds of eight 
different maturity classes. Our measure of a bond’s life is duration rather 
than the conventional measure of maturity. Duration is a weighted aver- 
age of the times until each payment (coupon and principal) made by the 
bond, and may be used to compare consistently bonds with very different 
payment streams, for which maturity may provide a misleading compari- 
son. A bond’s price volatility is also more directly related to duration than 
to  mat~rity.~ 
We follow the usual practice of computing the risk premiums on stocks 
and bonds relative to the rate of return on bills. Since bills are not com- 
pletely riskless in real terms, this requires a slight modification in equation 
(1). The modification is as follows: 
(1 ‘) risk premium on asset i relative to bills  = 
risk aversion  x  (covariance of asset i with the market portfolio 
- covariance of bills with the market portfolio). 
3.3  Implied Risk Premiums on Stocks and Bonds 
Consider a representative investor who goes to the market on the first 
day of each month and adjusts his portfolio according to his current views 
on the risk-return profile of different types of  investments. We  assume 
that the investor has the choice of the 10 different categories of financial 
assets mentioned at the end of the previous section, stocks, bills, and 
bonds of eight different durations. 
4. Duration is defined by Macaulay (1938). The distinction between maturity and duration 
is important, because the duration of bonds of  a given maturity shortened considerably in 
the late 1970s. For coupon bonds and mortgages, duration is always less than maturity. The 
difference between maturity  and duration  for ordinary coupon bonds and mortgages is 
greater, the longer the final maturity and the higher the level of interest rates. In 1953, the 
average maturity of  the bonds in our 8-year duration portfolio was just under 9 years; in 
1981, the average maturity was 23 years. This variation calls into question the appropriate- 
ness of  a bond-return series with a constant maturity of 20 years, such as the one tabulated 
by Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1982). 55  Risk and Required Returns on Debt and Equity 
The 10 different types of assets have been ordered according to their 
usual degree of riskiness, with  l-month Treasury bills carrying the least 
risk and (a diversified portfolio of common) stocks the most. In this con- 
text, “risky” refers to unexpected changes in security prices during the 
1-month holding period. Changes in the yield curve will lead to capital 
gains or losses on fixed interest debt, and owners of common stocks will 
also be unable to predict with great accuracy the value of their holdings 
1 month in the future. 
In our estimation using United States data we  assume that investors 
look back on the most recent 24 months when they estimate the volatilities 
of the different returns. We hold constant the degree of risk aversion5 at 
3.5 and the relative weights of the different categories in the market port- 
folio at roughly 65% stocks, 10% bonds, and 25% bilk6  All change in the 
risk premiums over time is therefore coming from changes in the var- 
iances and correlations among asset categories. 
An Appendix details our data sources and the precise procedure used 
for generating our time series, but it is possible to explain the general pro- 
cedure in a fairly straightforward manner: Each month we use the model 
to forecast expected returns for the next month. Actual returns on stocks 
and bonds in any period will deviate from these forecasts. Investors will 
observe these forecast errors and use this information to improve upon 
their estimates of the variances and correlations attached to the 10 cate- 
gories of risky investments. They do this by using data for the most recent 
24 months. As we proceed through time, the estimates change and so too 
do the risk premiums required in order to compensate for the perceived 
risk. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the results of this procedure in computing the stan- 
dard deviations for stock and long-term bond returns. It shows the stan- 
dard deviation of the forecast errors in the monthly rate of return on our 
diversified portfolio of common stocks and in the monthly rate of return 
on long-term government bonds. Assuming no change in correlations, the 
pattern  of  risk premiums should  follow the pattern of  standard devi- 
ations. Figure 3.2 shows the corresponding risk premiums on stocks and 
on long-term bonds. We emphasize that these risk premia are computed rela- 
tive to the return on T-bills. 
The most striking aspect of these figures is the dramatic increase in the 
volatility of long-term bonds starting in the last quarter of  1979, coincid- 
ing with a basic change in Federal Reserve operating procedure. Between 
5. For a discussion of  why 3.5 is a reasonable number to use for the degree of risk aversion, 
see Bodie et al. (1985). 
6. The relative weights of assets in the market portfolio changed over the period 1973-83, 
but it is shown in table AIVof Bodie et al. (1984) that the changes had only a small effect on 
risk premiums. 56  Zvi Bodie/Alex Kane/Robert McDonald 
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Fig. 3.1  Standard deviation of real rates of return on stocks and bonds, 
1973-84 
October 1979 and August 1982 the Fed was targeting monetary aggregates 
rather than interest rates, and as a result created a considerable increase in 
bond price volatility. 
The volatility of stock prices peaked at about 22% in the period from 
1975 to 1977. It subsequently declined, and has fluctuated in a range from 
12% to 17% since 1979. In the period 1981-83 the volatility of long-term 
bond prices actually exceeded that of stocks, although by the end of the 
period they were about equal. 
The risk premiums on stocks and bonds in figure 3.2 closely follow the 
time profiles of standard deviations shown in figure 3.1. But despite the 
rough equality in their standard deviations during 1982-83, the risk pre- 
mium on stocks is roughly double that on long-term bonds. This is pri- 
marily because stocks constitute a much larger proportion of the market 
portfolio than do long-term bonds.? 
7. To be more precise, the covariance of stocks with the market portfolio is approximately 
.65  x  variance of stocks  +  .I x  covariance between stocks and bonds, while the covar- 
iance  of  bonds  with  the  market  portfolio  is  approximately  .1  x  variance  of  bonds 
+  .65  x  covariance between stocks and bonds. The covariance between stocks and bonds 
is much smaller than the variance of stocks or bonds. Even though the variance of bonds and 
stocks were roughly equal in 1982-83,  the covariance of  stocks with the market (and there- 
fore the risk premium on stocks) was greater because the variance term has a weight of  .65 
for stocks vs. .l  for bonds. 57  Risk and Required Returns on Debt and Equity 
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Fig. 3.2  Risk premiums on stocks and bonds,  1973-84 
Note that while the volatility of long-term bonds has been falling more 
or less steadily since the end of 1981, the risk premium has not. After fall- 
ing precipitously at the end of  1981 and the beginning of 1982, it climbed 
back to its previous high before starting to come down again in 1983. In 
order to understand this seemingly odd behavior of the risk premium on 
bonds we must look at the correlation between bond and stock returns. 
Figure 3.3 shows the behavior of  the correlation  coefficient between 
bonds and stocks. It rowsteeply between the beginning of  1981 and the 
end of  1982, which served to counteract the effect of a declining bond 
price volatility on the risk premium on bonds.8 
Table 3.1 shows the risk premiums on all asset categories other than 
bills at three different points in time. Focusing on the December 1983 col- 
umn, we see that the risk premiums on bonds rise more or less uniformly 
with maturity class. Starting with .53% for the shortest, it rises to 3% for 
duration 6 and then levels off. It should be emphasized that these risk pre- 
8. We  can express the covariance of bonds with the market portfolio approximately  as 
.l x  variance of bonds + .65 x  (correlation between stocks and bonds  x  standard devi- 
ation of  stocks x  standard deviation of bonds) 
A rise in the correlation between stocks and bonds can offset a decline in the variance of 
bonds and keep the covariance of bonds with the market (and therefore  the risk premium on 
bonds) from falling. 58  Zvi Bodie/Alex Kane/Robert McDonald 
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Fig. 3.3  Correlation between the real rates of return on stocks and 
bonds, 1973-84 
Table 3.1  Estimated AMU~  Risk Premiums (percent per year) 
September  December  December 
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Note: Risk  premiums  calculated relative to rate of  return on Treasury bills. Market 
weights are those for 1980, with pension fund reserves weighted for long durations. 
miums are annualized rates of  return in excess of  the 1-month bill rate, 
which are expected to prevail over the next 1-month holding period. They 
are not yields to maturity. The risk premium on stocks is about 5.5%. 
Going across the columns in table 3.1 we see that the risk premium on 
stocks rose from about 5% in 1979 to 7% in 1981 and then back down to 59  Risk and Required Returns on Debt and Equity 
5.5%  in 1983. That same general pattern is evident for all of the bonds 
too. Duration 8 bonds, for example, rose from about .5%  in 1979 to 4% 
in 1981 and then back down to 3% in 1983. Bonds have clearly not re- 
turned as closely to their 1979 levels as have stocks. 
Table 3.2 shows the standard deviations and correlation matrices un- 
derlying the risk premiums in table 3.1. Note that, as suggested by the be- 
havior of risk premiums in table 3.1, the increase in standard deviation 
after October 1979 was greater for longer-duration bonds. 
Table 3.2  Standard Deviations and Correlations of Red Rates of Return 
Standard 
deviation 
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TPble 3.2  (continued) 
Common One-Month 
stocks  Bills  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
January 1982 -  December  1983 
15.04  1.08  3.004.595.857.849.31  10.63 11.81 11.91 
.17  .45  SO .48  .54  .54  .67  .55  .57 
.53  .42  .3  1  .34  .28  .26  .26  .I5 
.95  .91  .88  .87  .82  .80  .73 
.97  .90 .94  .89  .88  .83 
.90 .97  .90  .91  .88 
.92  .91  .90  .W 
.95  .96  .93 
.92  .94 
.96 
Bonds (duration in years) 
3.4  The Riskless Real Rate of Interest and the Risk Premium on 
Treasury Bills 
Up to this point we have followed the conventional practice of measur- 
ing risk premiums relative to  Treasury bills. While 1-month T-bills offer a 
risk-free nominal rate of return, uncertainty about the rate of inflation 
over the next month makes their real return risky. This inflation risk, how- 
ever, is small relative to the risk of unanticipated  stock and bond price 
changes during the month. Furthermore, for holding periods longer than 
1 month, a policy of  rolling over 30 day T-bills has been shown to offer a 
relatively stable real rate of return, because nominal bill rates can adjust 
rapidly to  the changing inflation rate. 
Nonetheless it is instructive to see what our model implies about the risk 
premium on T-bills over the 1973-83 period, particularly in the light of the 
increase in real bill rates in the 1980s. Perhaps we can explain at least part 
of this increase on the basis of increased covariance with the market port- 
folio, the way we did with bonds. 
Figure 3.4 shows the behavior of the risk premium implied by equation 
(l),  which says that it should be proportional to the covariance of the real 
rate of  return on bills with the market portfolio. It should be remembered 
that the risk premium for bills is relative to a hypothetical risk-free real 
rate of interest. It is clear from figure 3.4 that, if anything, the risk premium 
on T-bills has declined rather than risen in the 1980s. If we want to under- 
stand why real bill rates have risen we must seek other explanations. 61  Risk and Required Returns on Debt and Equity 
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Risk premium on  1-month Treasury bills,  1973-84  Fig. 3.4 
3.5  A Private Market for Indexed Bonds 
A recurrent theme in both the popular and technical finance literature 
has been the issue of indexed bonds, that is, bonds whose principal and in- 
terest payments are linked to some index of the cost of living and are 
therefore riskless in real terms. Economists from different sides of the 
ideological spectrum, like Milton Friedman and James Tobin, find them- 
selves in agreement on the desirability of having the federal government 
issue such an  asset. 
Some critics of this idea have argued that if index-linked bonds were a 
worthwhile innovation, the private capital markets would already have 
produced them. The data and theoretical model which we  employed earlier 
in this paper can be extended to shed some additional light on  this matter.9 
We computed the value to investors of  a private market for indexed 
bonds in the following way: first, we found the real risk-free rate at which 
an investor whose degree of  risk aversion is equal to the average would be 
indifferent to holding this riskless asset. (If the asset is privately supplied, 
it will necessarily be priced so that the average investor is indifferent about 
holding it.) Then, we asked what one-time dollar payment each investor 
would be willing to make in order for them to obtain the right to hold the 







desired amount of the riskless asset for the rest of their lives. This calcula- 
tion assumes that each investor holds an optimal portfolio, including as- 
sets besides the risk-free asset. Table 3.3 shows the amount which an in- 
vestor with risk aversion greater than the average would be willing to pay, 
per $10,000 of current wealth, for the opportunity to  invest in it. 
At an average degree of risk aversion of 3.5, if a market for a riskless 
real asset could be established costlessly, the market-clearing real interest 
rate would be about seven basis points below the mean real rate on con- 
ventional nominally risk-free bills. Table 3.3 shows how much investors 
with varying degrees of risk aversion would be willing to pay for the op- 
portunity to invest in a riskless real asset. 
The amounts do  not appear to be large. The numbers in the first column 
of table 3.3 show the results obtained using the variances and correlations 
estimated  for the 1982-83 subperiod. The second column shows the re- 
sults of an experiment in which we made all nominal debt securities twice 
as risky by doubling their variances and covariances, leaving the variance 
of  stocks unchanged.  While  the effect  is to approximately  double the 
amount at any degree of risk aversion, the magnitudes still seem small. 
An additional point about table 3.3 should be noted. The calculation 
assumes that there is no uncertainty about the future risk-free real rate. 
Thus, there is no distinction between indexed bills and indexed bonds. 
The numbers in table 3.3 apply equally to both assets. 
Our explanation for these results is that conventional 1-month bills are 
a fairly good low-risk alternative to stocks and bonds even for very risk- 
averse investors. The extra safety of  real return provided by an indexed 
bond is not worth much to  them. 
These results suggest one possible reason for the nonexistence of index 
bonds in the United States capital market. Since there would probably be 
some costs associated with creating a new market for such securities, the 
benefits would have to exceed those costs. Given the assumptions of our 
model, in particular the assumption that all market participants have the 
~~ 
Willingness to Pay 
Actual Variances 
and Covariances 
(  1982 -  83) 
Double All Variances And 
Covariances But Stocks 
0  0 
$6.50  $13 
16  32 
Table 3.3  Willingness to Pay for the Opportunity to Invest in a Real Riskless 
Asset (Dollars per Sl0,OOO of Wealth) 63  Risk and Required Returns on Debt and Equity 
same set of price expectations, the benefit from trading in these new secu- 
rities would have to arise from differences in the degree of risk aversion 
among investors. If, as table 3.3 suggests, the willingness to pay does not 
appear to be large over a fairly broad range of risk aversion coefficients, 
then one should not be surprised at the failure of  a private market for in- 
dex bonds to appear. 
3.6  Summary and Conclusions 
It appears that there may have been a substantial rise in risk premiums 
on long-term bonds in the early 1980s as a market response to an increase 
in bond price volatility and an increased correlation between bond and 
stock returns. The increase in bond price volatility was sudden and coin- 
cided with a shift in Federal Reserve policy to  stabilizing monetary aggre- 
gates rather than interest rates starting in the last quarter of 1979. Despite 
a fall in the long-term expected rate of inflation, long-term interest rates 
may have remained high during this period, at least partially because of 
this risk premium. 
By the end of 1983 the risk premium on bonds had fallen considerably 
from its peak and was trending downward, reflecting a major decline in 
bond price volatility. These results suggest that Federal Reserve policy can 
have a profound effect on  the level of long-term interest rates through the 
effect it has on  their variability. 
Appendix 
We assume that there are 10 classes of assets-stocks,  Treasury bills, and 
nominally  risk-free (i.e.,  government) bonds of  duration 1-8  years.  We 
used monthly real rates of return taken from Ibbotson and Sinquefield’s 
Treasury bill series, bond data from the United States government bond 
file of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and stock re- 
turns from the New York Stock Exchange monthly CRSP file, adjusting 
when necessary by the consumer price index excluding the cost of shelter. 
Land, residential housing, and consumer durables account for about 
40% of household net worth. Unfortunately, there are no reliable rate of 
return data for a variety of assets that are not literally either stocks or 
bonds but that are often perceived as substitutes for those assets. Time 
and demand deposits, for example, are assumed to have the same rate of 
return as Treasury bills; corporate bonds and municipal bonds are as- 
sumed to be like government bonds; and noncorporate equity is assumed 
to have the same characteristics as equity. In preference to excluding these 64  Zvi Bodie/Alex Kane/Robert McDonald 
assets entirely from the market portfolio,  we accept these assumptions 
and include these assets in the appropriate categories for the purpose of 
determining market weights. 
In order to  compute the covariance of the return on the market with the 
return on each asset category, we of course need to know the composition 
of the market portfolio (the market weights). Theoretically, this should re- 
flect the percentage of household net worth invested in the assets that 
comprise the market portfolio. We used the Flow of  Funds Sector Balance 
Sheets to obtain this breakdown for broad categories of assets for 1976 
and 1980. The Treasury Department’s Monthly Statement of the Public 
Debt was used to determine the relative quantities of government bonds 
of different maturities outstanding in those two years; and then maturities 
were converted into durations. 
Table 3.A.1 gives the results of these calculations. The stock category 
included investment company shares plus other corporate equity plus eq- 
uity in noncorporate business. 
Duration data are not available on pension fund and life insurance re- 
serves, which accounted for almost one-fifth of the financial net worth of 
households in both 1976 and 1980. We elected to compute asset weights 
under each of two assumptions-first,  that these assets were spread evenly 
across durations 1-8 (the assumption used to allocate mortgages) and sec- 
ond, that they are predominantly long term. In the second case, we used 
the sum-of-the-years’ digits method to allocate these assets triangularly 
across durations. The second case is probably more reasonable, inasmuch 
as pension  reserve  represents,  for  households,  a  long-term  nominally 
Table 3.A.1  Government Bond Weights 
1976  1980 
Corresponding  Corresponding 
Maturity  Maturity 
Duration  (years)  Weight  (years)  Weight 
0-  .25 
.25-  1.58 
1.58-  2.65 
2.65-  4.00 
4.00-  5.45 
5.45-  7.13 












0-  .25 
.25-  1.60 
1.60-  2.75 
2.75-  4.20 
4.20-  5.75 













Note: Flower bonds were omitted from the sample. The maturity date was taken to 
be fist call date if the bond sold at a premium, and maturity otherwise. 
Source: Weights by  maturity from Monthly Statement of  the Public Debt, May  1976, 
May  1980. Conversion to duration by using data on  CRSP government bond files. 65  Risk and Required Returns on Debt and Equity 
fixed claim. Table 3.A.2 reports results for both assumptions; the results 
reported in the body of the text are premised on  the second assumption. 
These market weights assume that the liabilities of  financial interme- 
diaries are treated as assets by the household sector, a coherent assump- 
tion under the finance paradigm. We also computed weights under the al- 
ternative assumption that financial intermediaries are a “veil,” so that 
households behave as if they directly hold the assets of intermediaries. 
The assumption that financial intermediaries are a veil results in a large 
redistribution  of the weights from short- to long-term assets, while the 
weight on equity remains at the same level. Although the risk premiums 
on longer-term bonds rise appreciably, the overall pattern and levels of 
risk premiums remain much the same. For further details see Bodie et al. 
(1984). 
3.A. 1 
We first computed the expected real rate of return on Treasury bills by 
saying that the expected real yield over the coming month is the current 
nominal yield on a 30-day Treasury bill, i,  less last month’s inflation rate, 
T-1: 
Ro  = i - r-]. 
To obtain an initial covariance matrix, we used the covariance of the total 
rates of return for the 24 months before the month in which we started the 
procedure. In each succeeding month, the most recent unexpected returns 
were entered into the data matrix, and the previous 24 months of data 
were used  to compute the covariance  matrix.  Thus, after the first  24 
Computing the Covariance Matrix 
’hble  3.A.2  Market Weights for the Household Sector 
Pension Fund  Pension Fund 
Reserves Spread  Reserves Weighted 
Evenly over  toward High 
Durations 1-8  Durations 
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months of the procedure, the covariance matrix was computed using only 
unexpected returns. 
The entries in the covariance matrix were computed as 
24 
24  t=I 
1 
Kj(Q  = -  C (RCT-1 -  Ri.T-1) (Rj,r-~  -  Rj,r-l), 
where R represents the realized real rate of return and R is the estimated 
expected real rate of return, computed using equation (1) and the previous 
month’s covariance estimate. 
An important advantage of this procedure is that the computed expected 
rates of  return for each period are consistent with the model. The only 
part of this procedure which is ad hoc is the specification of the process 
generating expected rates of return on Treasury bills. The measure of co- 
variance upon which the theory is based is the covariance of holding period 
rate of  return deviations from expected rates of  return. This is precisely 
what our procedure measures. 
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